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INTRODUCTION
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith I
(Smith II), the Supreme Court ruled that Oregon may deny unem-
ployment compensation benefits to Native American Church mem-
bers who were terminated from employment due to their use of the
sacramental drug peyote.2 The claimants, Alfred Smith and Galen
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). For the procedural history of the case, see infra note
6 and accompanying text.
2. Id. at 1606. Peyote, or Lophophora williamsii, is a small spineless cactus pos-
sessing psychedelic properties due to its mescaline content. It grows in a limited area
principally in northern Mexico and southern Texas. The plant is light green and
segmented, approximately one to two inches across, growing singly or in clusters
near the ground. It is harvested by cutting off the exposed tops of the clusters, leav-
ing the root to produce more "buttons," as the tops are usually called. Generally,
the buttons are dried before eaten. Although they are very bitter and often produce
vomiting,
1
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Black, were employed as counselors by a private drug and alcohol
rehabilitation agency.3 The agency terminated Smith and Black be-
cause it believed their use of peyote in Native American Church serv-
ices would undermine their authority and effectiveness as
counselors.4 When Smith and Black later applied for state unem-
ployment compensation benefits, the State Department of Human
Resources denied their applications because they had been fired "for
work-related misconduct."5 The question ultimately addressed by
the Supreme Court was whether a state may properly deny state ben-
efits on the basis of religious conduct.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The procedural history of Smith II is complex. Before final dispo-
sition, Smith IH had been before the Oregon Supreme Court three
times and before the United States Supreme Court twice.6 The Ore-
they also produce a warm and pleasant euphoria, an agreeable point of view,
relaxation, colorful visual distortions, and a sense of timelessness that are
conducive to the all-night ceremony of the Native American Church. To the
church's members, peyote is the essential ingredient, the sacrament, in their
well-established, unique ceremony. Peyote is not habit-forming, and in the
controlled ambience of a peyote meeting it is in no way harmful.
0. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION 3 (1987) [hereinafter STEWART]. For a contrary view
on the dangers of peyote use, see infra note 9.
3. Smith and Black's employer was the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources, 301 Or. 209, 211-23, 721 P.2d 445, 445-56 (1986); Black v. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 221, 223, 721 P.2d 451, 452 (1986). For
the procedural history of these cases, see infra note 6 and accompanying text.
4. The Court properly saw Smith and Black's employment duties at the private
agency as legally irrelevant. Concededly, given that Smith and Black were counselors
at a drug rehabilitation agency, their conduct on its face seems inconsistent with their
employment. The controlled use of peyote in Native American ceremonies, similar
to the use of sacramental wine in Christian ceremonies, does not constitute drug
abuse. Although sacramental use of peyote is intended to produce a hallucinogenic
effect, there is no evidence to show that such controlled use poses a threat to the
individual either in terms of physical harm or potential addiction. In fact, ritual pe-
yote use has been recommended to combat drug and alcohol abuse within the Native
American culture. See generally P. Pascarosa & S. Futterman, Ethnopsychedelic Therapy
for Alcoholics: Observations in the Peyote Ritual of the Native American Church, 8 J. OF
PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS 215 (1976) (peyote used to help overcome alcoholism); B. Al-
baugh & P. Anderson, Peyote in the Treatment of Alcoholism Among American Indians,
131:11 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1247, 1249 (1974) ("[T]he philosophy, teachings, and for-
mat of the [Native American Church] can be of great benefit to the Indian
alcoholic.").
5. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990) (Under state law, Oregon can disqualify employees who have been discharged
for work-related "misconduct" from receipt of state unemployment compensation
benefits.).
6. The litigation concluded its journey through the legal system nearly seven
years after Smith and Black were terminated. The sequence of the dispute, presented
[Vol. 17
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gon Court of Appeals, initially finding for Smith and Black, held that
Oregon's denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated
their free exercise rights under the first amendment and that the
criminality of peyote possession was irrelevant to Oregon's "compel-
ling governmental interest" claim. 7 On appeal to the Oregon
Supreme Court, the state again argued that because Smith and
Black's consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law, the
denial of benefits was permissible. After extensively discussing the
history and legitimacy of Peyotism in the Native American Church,8
the Oregon court found that the criminality of peyote use was irrele-
vant because Smith and Black were not denied benefits in order to
enforce the criminal code. 9 Rather, the court found the state's rea-
son for denying benefits was to maintain the integrity of the unem-
ployment compensation fund, an insufficient objective when weighed
against the claimants' free exercise rights. to The Oregon Supreme
Court, in turn, concluded that Smith and Black were entitled to un-
employment benefits. I I
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue
of whether the criminality of Smith and Black's conduct was relevant
to the free exercise question.12 'The Court vacated the Oregon
in chronological order, is as follows: Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources, 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985), affirmed by Smith v. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 562, 715 P.2d 93 (1986), vacated by Employ-
ment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) [hereinafter
Smith I] (also vacating Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or.
221, 721 P.2d 451 (1986), aff'g 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274 (1985) [hereinafter
Black]), on remand to Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd
by Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
[hereinafter Smith II], on remand to Smith v. Employment Div., 310 Or. 376, 799 P.2d
148 (1990) [hereinafter Smith II1].
7. Black, 75 Or. App. at 741, 707 P.2d at 1278.
8. Black, 301 Or. at 225-26, 721 P.2d at 453-54.
9. Under Oregon law, persons guilty of intentional possession of a "controlled
substance" are guilty of a "Class B felony." ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987).
Section 475.005(6) of Oregon Revised Statutes, following federal law, labels peyote
as a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning the legislature has found that it has a
high potential for abuse, that there is no currently accepted medical use, and that
there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision. See
also 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (1981).
For a discussion of the inclusion of peyote as a controlled substance in response
to the drug scare of the 1960s, see STEWART, supra note 2, at 3.
Note that, although peyote contains mescaline, from a user's standpoint, mesca-
line and peyote are greatly dissimilar. Peyote is highly distasteful, often causing its
users to vomit. A recreational user would most likely prefer synthetically-produced
mescaline due to its lack of unpleasant side effects. Id.
10. Smith 1, 301 Or. at 218-20, 721 P.2d at 450-51.
11. Id. (stating that a state's financial interest in the payment of benefits is not
"compelling" when weighed against the claimant's free exercise rights).
12. Smith I, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
1991]
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court's determination and found that criminal conduct may lessen
the state's burden in a free exercise analysis, if the criminalization
itself does not violate the free exercise clause. The Court, however,
remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for a determination of
whether the Oregon legislature exempted or intended to exempt
sacramental peyote use from its criminal code.'1 The Oregon court,
on remand, found that the Oregon legislature did not intend to ex-
empt sacramental peyote use from its criminal code and, therefore,
that Smith and Black's peyote use was prohibited by the Oregon stat-
ute.14 The state supreme court further concluded that this statutory
prohibition against religious use of peyote was not constitutionally
valid. 15
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.16 This
time the Court decided that, because peyote's criminalization in Ore-
gon was a general law not specifically directed at the plaintiffs' reli-
gious activity, the state need not show a "compelling governmental
interest" to deny state benefits for regulated religious conduct so
long as the proscription was "religion neutral."1 7 The Supreme
Court thus held that a state may deny unemployment compensation
benefits to Native Americans who are dismissed from their jobs for
ingesting the sacramental drug peyote.' 8
In so holding, the Court has denied rights to Native Americans
who engage in a practice central to their faith.19 Although denying
the right to engage in central religious practices is not new to the
Court,20 the Court, in the Smith II decision, avoided the use of the
"compelling governmental interest" test prescribed by previous case
law.2 1 The Court thus reduced the standard of review for cases in
13. Smith 1, 485 U.S. 660, 674 (1988).
14. Smith II, 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
15. Id.
16. Smith H, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
17. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990).
18. Id. at 1606. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the original
order of the state Employment Appeals Board. Smith II1, 310 Or. 376, 380, 799 P.2d
148, 149 (1990) ("[T]here is little left for us to decide.").
19. The ingestion of peyote is a sacrament by which Native Americans faithfully
communicate with their deity, "Great Spirit." See STEWART, supra note 2, at 327-36; see
also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964)
(Peyote is the sine qua non of the Native American Church.); E. ANDERSON, PEYOTE:
THE DIVINE CAcrUs 41-65 (1980); TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 96-104 (1975).
20. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (outlawing the Mor-
mon practice of polygamy).
21. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Wisconsin compulsory
school attendance law when applied to members of Amish faith violated the free ex-
ercise clause of the first amendment.); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(striking down the state's conviction ofJehovah's Witnesses for selling religious ma-
[Vol. 17
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which a state enacts a criminal law, or otherwise "generally applica-
ble" law, which significantly burdens a religious practice.22 The
Court's new open-ended standard allows the state to pass any law
restricting or prohibiting religious practices so long as the prohibi-
tion also restricts persons who are not members of the religion.23
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The free exercise clause of the first amendment commands: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . * "24 Historically, the free
exercise clause has been applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 25 Although the first amendment purports to give reli-
gious practices great deference, one's right to freely exercise his or
her religion is, at times, necessarily at odds with a state's interest in
regulating its citizenry. 26 Accordingly, cases analyzing the free exer-
cise clause have balanced an individual's rights against the interests
of the state.27 When presented with a case in which a state law alleg-
edly restricted the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court first
looked to the regulation's direct or incidental effect on the religious
practice.28 Second, the Court looked to whether the state has a
terial without a license because it violated constitutional guarantees of religious lib-
erty and freedom of speech).
22. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990).
23. The new standard, as stated by the Court, would allow a state to maintain
laws which only incidentally restrict religious practices. See id at 1602.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
26. Cf. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REV. 327 (1969).
The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another of the
fundamental concerns of government: public health and safety, public peace
and order, defense, revenue. To measure an individual interest directly
against one of these rarified values inevitably makes the individual interest
appear the less significant.
Id. at 330-31; see also Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1606, 1705-12 (1987) (history of the balancing test).
27. SeeJ. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTrIONAL LAW § 17.6, at 1067
(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK] ("Burdens on the practice of religion will be toler-
ated whenever they are incident to a regulation of secular activities and the state
interest is of a magnitude that overrides the claims for a religious exemption."); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrnmONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
TRIBE] (listing elements of balancing test).
28. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). "To strike down, without the
most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exer-
cise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the regular practice
itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606.
See also Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). "It is virtually self-
evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a govern-
mental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the
1991)
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"compelling governmental interest" in the practice.29 Finally, if the
state had shown a compelling interest, the Court examined whether
reasonable alternative means are available to accomplish the state's
regulatory objective.30
A "strict scrutiny" standard of review for free exercise cases has
evolved over time.3 1 Prior to 1940, the Supreme Court interpreted
the free exercise clause as affording the federal government great
latitude to impinge on one's religious beliefs and practices.3 2 After
1940, when the Court began to apply the free exercise clause to the
states,33 the strictures on religious conduct began to loosen rapidly.
The Court achieved this increased control over state regulation of
religious activity by borrowing the strict scrutiny standard of review
claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights." Id. at 303. Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles
and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the
State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal sanctions
directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only the begin-
ning, not the end, of our inquiry. For '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidi-
ously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect.'
Id. at 403-04 (footnote and citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (considering "whether some compelling
state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statutejusti-
fies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right"); see also
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(describing the government's interest as "unusually important"); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1981) (finding "the Government's interest in assuring
mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the social security
system [to be] very high").
30. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940). The case involved
Jehovah Witnesses' avoidance of the state certification requirements for door-to-door
solicitation. In Cantwell, the statute conditioned solicitation licensing upon a determi-
nation of whether the cause was "religious" or not. The Court stated:
The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.
But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious
views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a
determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a
forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the constitution.
Id.; see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (Court reversed a New Jersey
conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses who had distributed circulars without first ob-
taining a police permit.).
31. See NOWAK, supra note 27, § 17.8, at 1073 (referring to "compelling state in-
terest" test); TRIBE, supra note 27, § 14-13, at 1261 (referring to a "compelling inter-
est, narrowly defined") (emphasis in original).
32. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding federal law
which prohibited polygamy, a central tenet of the Mormon faith). The Court stated
that "[I]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id.
33. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
[Vol. 17
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from free speech cases. By 1961, the Court had completely assimi-
lated the strict scrutiny standard into its free exercise analysis.34
Early free exercise cases addressed only the issue of state burdens
on religious conduct, as opposed to a denial of state benefits based
on religious conduct. Sherbert v. Verner3 5 obliterated any distinction
between burdens and benefits. Following Sherbert, the strict scrutiny
test was applied to all free exercise cases regardless of whether they
involved state burdens on religious conduct or the denial of state
benefits due to religious conduct.36
A strict scrutiny standard allows the Court to overturn any state or
federal law that has no overriding "compelling governmental inter-
est."3 7 The principle behind a strict scrutiny or compelling interest
standard of review38 is to protect liberty interests, interests which the
Court views as nearly inviolate.39
To withstand a challenge in an area protected by a strict scrutiny
standard, a state must show that its means-usually a state statute-
are necessary for achieving its ends, and that its ends-the state's
purpose behind adopting the statute-are constitutionally legiti-
mate.40 Accordingly, a state must show a compelling governmental
interest in its law, and that its law is the only reasonable alternative
for achieving its end.4l This high standard of review is one which
gives the Court almost complete discretion in reviewing state laws.
The strict scrutiny standard highlights the historical importance of
the free exercise clause as a reflection of the Constitution's contempt
34. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (State must show a compel-
ling interest.) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (a free speech
case)).
35. Id. at 403-04.
36. Id. at 406.
37. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 14-13, at 1251 (discussing "particularly important
governmental goal" standard).
38. The terms "strict scrutiny" and "compelling interest" are used interchangea-
bly throughout this comment. A compelling governmental interest is a necessary
subset of the strict scrutiny standard of review. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (strict scrutiny); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (compelling interest); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) ("interests of the highest order"); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462
(1971) (substantial interest); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("paramount interests");
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (state's secular goals).
39. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943) ("[S]preading one's
religious beliefs ... is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitu-
tional protection as the more orthodox types."); see also id. at 115 ("[F]reedom of
religion [is] a preferred position.").
40. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (State must show the law
is necessary to achieve its legitimate state goal.). The Supreme Court, of course,
defines constitutional legitimacy.
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for governmental restriction on religion.42
As previously mentioned, religious freedom is at times necessarily
in conflict with vital state interests. While the history of the Consti-
tution, the first amendment and the case law interpreting the free
exercise clause all underscore the importance of religious freedoms,
the Court's application of this principle has been inconsistent.
In the history of the free exercise clause, a distinction between "di-
rect" and "indirect" burdens on religious practices has developed.43
The distinction is significant because the majority in Smith II
brooded over adopting a rule which would inquire into the centrality
of a particular religious practice to the aggrieved claimant's reli-
gion.44 In the past, free exercise claimants were required to show
that the state or federal regulation directly restricted their rights to
freely exercise their religion.45 But because today a state may over-
ride either a direct or indirect burden simply by showing a compel-
ling governmental interest, the distinction is, for practical purposes,
meaningless. Nevertheless, the distinction illustrates the centrality
issue the Court feared in Smith II and also serves as an introduction
to free exercise law.
A direct burden is a law which on its face prohibits a religious
practice. A simple example is the effect of the prohibition of polyg-
amy on the Mormon Church.46 An indirect burden is a law which
42. See TRIBE, supra note 27, § 14-3, at 1159 (discussing the views of Jefferson,
Madison and Roger Williams on the religion clauses). Jefferson went so far as to
argue prohibition of clergy holding public office. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
621-22 (1978), the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute which embodied
the Jeffersonian view. Madison believed both church and government should be
completely free of interference from the other. Id.
43. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (upholding Sunday-
closing laws on the grounds that the laws only indirectly burdened those who, by
their faith, also closed their businesses on Saturdays).
44. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious
beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field,
than it would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before
applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field. What princi-
ple of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion
that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?
Id. at 1604; see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 ("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.").
45. The distinction between direct and indirect is found on the face of the stat-
ute. It does not concern the degree to which the religious practice is restricted. A
statute which applies only to a particular religious group would be a direct restriction
on that group's practice, while a statute which is broader in scope may be an indirect
restriction on the practice. Thus, if the scope of affected persons includes those
outside a specific religious class, the statute will more likely withstand attack. See
NOWAK, supra note 27, § 17.16, at 1101 (A statute specifically burdening a religious
group should be struck down.).
46. NowAK, supra note 27, § 17.7, at 1069. Polygamy was a central tenet in the
[Vol. 17
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does not expressly prohibit a specific religious practice. Its effect,
however, is to make the general practice of a religion more burden-
some. 47 An example of an indirect burden is the impact of Sunday-
closing laws on Sabbatarian-owned businesses.48 According to their
religion, Sabbatarians must close their businesses on Saturdays. A
law requiring Sunday closure necessarily limits the income of Sab-
batarians by placing them at a competitive disadvantage, thus "indi-
rectly" burdening the practice of their faith.
The comparison between direct and indirect burdens on religious
practices illustrates that the Court is aware of both the distinction
and the inquiry. Yet, the Court in Smith H stated that an inquiry into
the "centrality" of a religious practice to a particular faith was be-
yond its ability to fairly adjudicate.49
The "compelling governmental interest" test has also developed
through the Court's consideration of the free exercise clause. Using
the principle of retroactive decision-making-the idea that if the
Court determines a law to be unconstitutional, that law has always
been unconstitutional50-this comment defines a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in accordance with the historical treatment of free
exercise clause cases. Although the test did not expressly exist until
1940, it is, in fact, the test the Court has applied throughout the his-
tory of the free exercise clause.51
In Reynolds v. United States,52 the Court observed that the United
States' interest in social welfare and governance warranted a prohibi-
tion of polygamy.53 The Court enforced the prohibition, thereby
Mormon faith before 1862 when the federal government outlawed polygamy. 12
Stat. 501 (1862).
47. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
49. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990).
50. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Court
stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." The Court also noted that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is void." The Court further held that allowing the laws of the major-
ity to overcome the dictates of the Constitution "would subvert the very foundation
of all written constitutions." Id. at 178.
51. This convention is used only to provide consistency to the myriad rationales
and permutations found throughout the history of free exercise doctrine. This com-
ment does not rely on this presumption to argue that the Court departed from the
strict scrutiny standard of review in Smith II.
52. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
53. Id. at 165.
Upon [monogamy] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which govern-
ment is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or
1991]
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overriding the Mormons' free exercise rights.54 The Court adopted
the rule disfavoring polygamy after determining monogamy was
rooted in Anglo-Saxon tradition.55 Disturbingly, the Court alluded
to the fact that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the
northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establish-
ment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the
life of Asiatic and of African people."56 As further rationale, the
Court cited the "despotism"5 7 which follows from polygamy and the
"evil consequences that were supposed to flow from plural mar-
riages."58 The Reynolds Court failed to provide any substantive in-
sight into what governmental interests may override which particular
religious practices, other than religious practices which do not con-
form to Anglo-Saxon mores.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,59 the Court found a sufficient governmental
interest in the setting aside of Sunday as a day of rest to the eco-
nomic detriment of those who observe their Sabbath on Saturday. 60
The Court concluded that the state's choice of Sunday as its day for
"rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity" 61 was a religion-neutral
choice. According to the Court, the predominantly Christian state of
Pennsylvania somehow serendipitously selected Sunday as its day for
rest.6 2 Moreover, the Court found that an exemption for Sabbatari-
polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the
government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests.
Id. at 165-66.
54. Id. at 167. The Court saw a great need for government to regulate the insti-
tution of marriage. The Court stated: "To permit this would be to make the pro-
fessed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land .... " Id.
55. See generally id at 164-66 (discussing historical prohibitions on polygamy).
56. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
57. Id. at 166.
58. Id. at 168.
59. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
60. Id. at 609.
61. See id. at 607. The Court found religion neutrality by default:
Also, in McGowan, we examined several suggested alternative means by
which it was argued that the State might accomplish its secular goals without
even remotely or incidentally affecting religious freedom. We found there
that a State might well find that those alternatives would not accomplish
bringing about a general day of rest. We need not examine them again
here.
Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
62. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Braunfeld, noted the consequences of the deci-
sion for members of another religion:
Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose
between his religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice.
It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand. For me
this is not something that can be swept under the rug and forgotten in the
interest of enforced Sunday togetherness. I think the impact of this law
upon these appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free
exercise of their religion.
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ans would be destructive of the state's supposed goal of uniform-
ity.63 The Court reasoned, therefore, that Sunday was not only a
permissible, but a necessary choice by the state.64 Like Reynolds,
Braunfeld shows that if government is dominated by mainstream
Christians, then others must follow legislatively-mandated customs,
whatever the "incidental" effects on their religious practices may be.
In contrast with Reynolds and Braunfeld, the Court has protected
free exercise rights where no compelling governmental interest was
found. The trilogy of Sherbert v. Verner,65 Thomas v. Review Board,66
and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission67 exemplifies the
Court's high-water mark in its decisions upholding religious free-
doms. Significantly for the Court in Smith H, each of these cases in-
volved a state's unconstitutional denial of unemployment
compensation benefits.
In Sherbert, the Court held that a state could not deny unemploy-
ment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who was ter-
minated because of her religiously-based refusal to work on
Saturday.68 The Court found no compelling interest in the state's
claim that the restriction avoided fraudulent unemployment com-
pensation claims.69 An essential element of the state's claim is a
showing that there is no reasonable alternative to the state's restric-
tion on religious practices.70 In Sherbert, the Court found that the
state failed to show the law in question was necessary to reduce
fraudulent claims. 7' Relying on this void, the Court held the state's
denial of benefits unconstitutional. 72
The Court also found no compelling state interest in Thomas v. Re-
view Board.73 In Thomas, the Court held that the state's denial of un-
employment compensation was a violation of Thomas' free exercise
rights.74 Thomas had quit his job because his employer transferred
Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. "[E]nforcement problems would be more difficult since there would be two
or more days to police rather than one .... " Id. at 608.
64. See id. at 607 ("[Wle cannot find a State without power to provide a weelly
respite from all labor .... ").
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
67. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
68. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
69. Id. at 407 ("No abuse ... or danger has been advanced in the present
case.").
70. See supra note 28.
71. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 ("[N]o such objection appears to have been made
before the South Carolina Supreme Court. [N]or . . . would the record appear to
sustain [the existence of a danger of fraud].").
72. Id. at 410.
73. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
74. Id. at 719-20.
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him from a position in its metal foundry to a department which pro-
duced parts for military tanks. 75 While some evidence showed that
Thomas' religion, Jehovah's Witness, did not prohibit work of that
kind,76 the Supreme Court found this irrelevant to the question of
whether his free exercise rights had been violated. 77 The state failed
to show that allowing a religious exemption would create an undue
burden for the unemployment compensation system and require
costly and intrusive inquiries by employers into employees' beliefs.78
The state's asserted justification for the denial of benefits thus failed
to meet the compelling governmental interest test.79
Finally, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission 8O involved the
discharge of a recent convert to the Jehovah's Witness faith for her
refusal to work on Saturdays. Florida then denied her unemploy-
ment compensation because benefits were only available to those
who become "unemployed through no fault of their own." 8 1 The
Court expressly found that Florida had no compelling governmental
interest in the denial.82
These and other cases show a gradual narrowing of the Court's
definition of compelling governmental interest and, consequently, a
concomitant accession in religious freedoms. The former, more re-
strictive views of the free exercise clause embraced in Reynolds v.
United States and Braunfeld v. Brown, however, lurk in the precedential
history of the free exercise clause.
75. See id. at 709.
76. Id. at 711 n.3 ("It is reasonable to assume that some of the sheet processed in
the roll foundry may have found its way into tanks or other weapons .... ").
The Court noted that "[t]he Indiana Supreme Court apparently took a different
view of the record. It concluded that 'although the claimant's reasons for quitting
were described as religious, it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious
basis of his belief was.' In that court's view, Thomas had made a merely 'personal
philosophical choice rather than a religious choice.' " Id. at 714 (footnote omitted).
77. "Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer
admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articu-
lated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ."
Id. at 715. "The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine
whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because
of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion." Id. at 716.
78. See id. at 719 (noting lack of evidence on the record).
79. Id.
80. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
81. FLA. STAT. § 443.021 (1985), quoted in Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138.
82. Id. at 141 (citing Sherbert and Thomas). The Court also disregarded the state's
proposal for an intermediate standard of review. Id. Interestingly,Justices Scalia and
White, who joined in the Hobbie decision which expressly applied strict scrutiny to the
denial of unemployment compensation benefits, later joined in the majority opinion
of Smith II which discarded strict scrutiny.
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III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were employed as drug counselors
by the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment (ADAPT).8s Smith is a seventy-year-old Klamath
Native American and member of the Native American Church.8 4
Black is a non-Native American who first came into contact with the
Native American Church through his employment at ADAPT. He
became a member of the American Native Church in March of
1983.85 Before coming to ADAPT, both Smith and Black had bouts
with chemical dependency, but Smith had not used alcohol since
1971,86 and Black had not used drugs since 1982.87
Smith, who had counseled alcoholics since 1971, was hired as a
counselor by ADAPT in 1982 and discharged in 1984.88 Black was
hired by ADAPT in 1982 as a resident assistant.89 After two promo-
tions, Black became a counselor in June of 1983.90 He was termi-
nated in October of 1983 after ADAPT discovered his initial
sacramental peyote use.91
Although their circumstances were somewhat different, ADAPT
treated Smith and Black alike. Upon learning of their peyote use,
ADAPT's executive director gave both Smith and Black the option
either to terminate their employment or to enter into the employee
assistance program for those who had relapsed into chemical depen-
dency.92 Both counselors refused to enter into the employee assist-
ance program, asserting their belief that sacramental peyote use was
not "misuse" of drugs as defined by ADAPT's personnel policy.93
They each contended that their use of peyote was part of a ritual
stemming from their legitimate religious beliefs. 94
Both Smith and Black applied to Oregon's Employment Division
83. Smith I, 301 Or. 209, 211, 721 P.2d 444, 446 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Black, 75 Or. App. 735, 736, 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985).
86. Smith 1, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d at 446.
87. Black, 75 Or. App. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276.
88. Smith I, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d at 446.
89. Black, 75 Or. App. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276.
90. Id.
91. Id. ADAPT's personnel policy provides that "'[m]isuse of alcohol and/or
other mind-altering substances by a staff member' is grounds for termination." Smith
I, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d at 446. The court noted that Smith signed a copy of those
rules on his second day of employment.
92. Black, 75 Or. App. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276; Smith I, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d
at 446.
93. Smith 1, 301 Or. at 211, 721 P.2d at 446; see also supra note 91 (ADAPT's
personnel policy).
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for unemployment compensation benefits and were denied.95 Both
successfully appealed the denial to a referee. The Employment Ap-
peals Board (Board) reversed the referee's decisions.96
In Smith's case, the referee concluded that, although Smith had
committed misconduct,
there is no evidence in the hearing record to indicate that granting
benefits to claimants whose unemployment is caused by adherence
to religious beliefs would have any significant impact on the trust
fund, it cannot be held that the alleged State interest warrants in-
terference with the claimant's freedom of religion.9 7
The Board reversed, basing its decision on the illegality of peyote
use in Oregon.98
In Black's case, the referee also granted unemployment compensa-
tion, but concluded that his use of peyote was "an isolated instance
of poor judgment."99 ADAPT appealed to the Board and the Board
denied Black benefits.100 The Board based its decision on what it
viewed as Black's "wilful violation" of employment rules and the
"optional" nature of peyote use in the rite.1o l
The ultimate question before the Supreme Court was whether the
claimants' peyote use was a sufficient reason to deny state unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. Initially, one may be compelled to
think that Smith and Black, as drug counselors, should not be al-
lowed benefits since their termination was for drug use. The ques-
tion is not so quickly answered, however, upon consideration of the
spiritual nature of the peyote ritual, its carefully controlled atmos-
phere, and the use of peyote among Native Americans to combat
alcoholism.
95. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1598 (1990). Both Smith and Black were deter-
mined to be ineligible for unemployment compensation because they were dis-
charged for work-related "misconduct." Id.
96. Black, 75 Or. App. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276; Smith I, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d
at 446.
97. Smith 1, 301 Or. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
98. Id. The Board stated that " '[t]he compelling state interest is in the proscrip-
tion of illegal drugs, not merely in the burden upon the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Trust Fund.'" Id.
99. Black, 75 Or. App. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1276-77. The Board found that Black was properly
discharged for engaging in actions constituting employee misconduct:
'He knew the employer's rules prohibited the use of drugs and alcohol and
also recognized that he could be terminated if he violated those policies.
Although the use of an illegal drug was optional during the religious cere-
mony, the claimant wilfully made the choice to ingest those drugs. He did
so even after he was advised by others that such a choice would perhaps be
incorrect or improper.'
Id. at 736, 707 P.2d at 1277.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Although the Supreme Court has historically interpreted the free
exercise clause narrowly so as to allow states to regulate at the ex-
pense of religious liberties, recently the Court has broadened the
scope of religious protection.102 The Court has thrice ruled against
states which attempted to disallow unemployment compensation
benefits to employees who had either voluntarily quit their jobs be-
cause of their religious beliefs or had been terminated for cause due
to their religious practices.103 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court invali-
dated a state's attempt to deny unemployment compensation to a
Seventh Day Adventist because of her refusal to work on Satur-
days.104 Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,t05 the Court held that a
Jehovah's Witness could not be denied unemployment compensation
because he refused to accept an intra-corporate transfer that would
have required him to assemble military equipment.10 6 Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Commission extended Sherbert and Thomas to protect
a recently-converted religious claimant.
In contrast, the Court in Smith II held that Smith and Black did not
have a constitutional right to practice their religion without suffering
the denial of state unemployment compensation benefits.1o 7 The
Court did not apply the "compelling governmental interest" test and
102. Although most of the Court's early decisions favored the states, the Court
has made progress, albeit grudgingly and haltingly, toward allowing more religious
freedoms at the expense of the state's regulatory interests.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court struck down a state constitu-
tional provision which required that all prospective public office holders profess a
belief in God. In the same year, however, the Court also decided Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the appellants challenged a state's right to pass
Sunday closing laws as applied to Sabbatarians who, in addition to closing their busi-
nesses on Sundays, also closed them on Saturdays. The Court rejected the argument
that the law caused plaintiffs unwarranted economic loss. Id. at 605. Instead, the
Court found that the state's interest in declaring a uniform day of rest overrode any
of the incidental effects of the secular statute. The Court reached its holding despite
many other states' exemption of Sabbatarians from their Sunday closing laws. Id.
103. The Court would not go so far, however, as to allow an Amish employer to
refuse to pay social security taxes and to refuse to accept social security benefits.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). This holding is in line with the general
view that the Court will not grant a federal tax exemption to any class for fear of
opening a Pandora's box. See id. at 259.
104. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
105. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
106. Id. at 710, 719-20. As the plaintiff worked in the foundry of the same weap-
ons-producing corporation and did not show that direct involvement in weapons pro-
duction was expressly adverse to the Jehovah's Witness faith, this case is somewhat
anomalous and arguably overbroad.
107. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). The denial of unemployment compensation
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its accompanying strict standard of review. Instead, the Court distin-
guished free exercise precedent and adopted a new rule which would
uphold any "generally applicable" law which infringes on religious
freedoms.108 The Court disposed of precedent by first distinguish-
ing Smith II on the basis of peyote's criminalization in Oregon.109
The Court then further distinguished the case on the rationale that
prior cases prescribing a strict scrutiny standard were not based
solely on the free exercise clause." 10 While one could read Smith 11
as attempting to limit its rule to criminalized religious practices, the
Court's opinion, as a whole, appears to be more broad-based.Ill
A. The Court Avoids the Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review By Initially
Finding Peyote's Criminalization Religion-Neutral
Smith and Black were fired from their jobs as drug counselors be-
cause they violated Oregon law.12 The Court found the state's in-
terest in regulating narcotic use sufficient to override Smith and
Black's freedom to use peyote as a sacrament in their faith.' 13 The
Court came to this conclusion by finding the Oregon statute
criminalizing peyote to be "religion neutral," and by finding that the
statute had not been enacted to restrict Smith and Black's rights to
exercise their religion but rather had only "incidentally" denied
these rights.114
108. Id. at 1603, 1606.
109. Id. at 1599.
110. Id. at 1601.
111. The Court seems to limit the case to criminalized conduct:
Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of
'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' one large step further. They con-
tend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the
reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious prac-
tice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the
drug for other reasons.
Id. at 1599. The Court further states, however: "They [Smith and Black] assert, in
other words, that 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' includes requiring any
individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the perform-
ance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires)." Id. The Court then uses
the term "generally applicable law" throughout the remainder of the opinion. Id. at
1600-02. The use of the term "generally applicable law," if read to mean more than
just criminal law, seems to indicate that cases such as Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie are
at risk.
112. ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987) provides: "It is unlawful.., to possess
a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained . . . pursuant to a valid
prescription .... " Possession of peyote is a Class B felony. Id. § 475.992(4)(a).
113. Smith 11, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
114. Id. The Court reached the conclusion that the statute here is religion neutral
by first stating that the exercise of religion often involves the performance of physical
acts, as well as the existence of beliefs. The Court concedes that a statute would be
unconstitutional if it sought to ban acts which are engaged in for religious purposes
only. Id. at 1599-1600.
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In first distinguishing Smith H on the basis of peyote's criminaliza-
tion, the Court was forced to find the law religion neutral in order to
avoid inquiring into the importance of peyote to the Native Ameri-
can Church.' 15 Had the Court so inquired, it would have found that
sacramental peyote use is so central to the Native American Church
that without it the Church would not exist." 16
The Court based its religion-neutrality argument on the premise
that peyote's proscription affects all citizens equally; that is, while
Native American Church members are adversely affected, so are rec-
reational peyote users. The argument fails, or at least is significantly
weakened, however, if sacramental peyote use has more meaning to
the Native American Church member than it does to the recreational
user. Because sacramental peyote use for Native American Church
members is a means to a legitimate religious end, rather than an end
in itself, the neutrality argument must fail.
Peyote is not only a sacrament but an object of worship in the Na-
tive American Church. Sacramental peyote use defines the Native
American Church-Native Americans who are not members of the
Church generally do not use peyote, while those who do use peyote
generally closely follow the moral precepts of the Native American
Church.t 17
By first distinguishing Smith II on the basis of religion neutrality,
the Court avoided an inquiry into the "centrality" of peyote use to
the Native American Church. Had the Court employed a strict scru-
tiny standard of review, it would have had to find in favor of Smith
and Black. The strict scrutiny standard requires a state to show that
its law is a necessary condition to achieving its regulatory goals. Ac-
cordingly, to prevail, Oregon would have to show not only that its
criminalization of peyote served a compelling state interest, but that
its denial of an exemption for the Native American Church also
served a compelling state interest. The Court would have had to
conclude that Oregon had no compelling state interest in refusing to
grant the Native American Church an exemption from the state's
criminalization of peyote.
115. See generally STEWART, supra note 2. Peyotism has become a unifying influence
in Native American life, providing the basis for ceremonies, friendships, social gath-
erings, travel and marriage. It has been a source of comfort and healing and a means
of expression for a troubled people. It also has produced one of the strongest Pan-
Indian movements in the United States. Id.
116. Id. at 224; see also id. at 330-32 (describing Peyotism as more than an occa-
sional ritual but rather a part of daily life); TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH:
INDIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 96-104 (1975).
117. STEWART, supra note 2, at 224.
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1. Peyote Use is a Central Tenet in the Native American Church
The sacramental use of peyote is at the very heart of the Native
American religion."18 Adherents believe that through the slightly
hallucinogenic effect caused by peyote they communicate with their
deity, the Great Spirit. Followers observe a ritualistic observance of
the sacrament which, anthropologists estimate, reaches back four
hundred years or more.1 9 Moreover, among the millions of Native
Americans scattered from Mexico to Canada, the peyote celebration
remains uniform. 120
An illuminating description of the celebration is provided by People
v. Woody,121 a case in which the California Supreme Court was
presented with the same issue as Smith II, but reached an opposite
result:
The 'meeting,' a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of pe-
yote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. The meet-
ing convenes in an enclosure and continues from sundown
Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the past good for-
tune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will 'sponsor' a
meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the
next morning's breakfast. The 'sponsor,' usually but not always the
'leader,' takes charge of the meeting; he decides the order of events
and the amount of peyote to be consumed. Although the individ-
ual leader exercises an absolute control of the meeting, anthropol-
ogists report a striking uniformity of its ritual.
A meeting connotes a solemn and special occasion. Whole fami-
lies attend together, although children and young women partici-
pate only by their presence. Adherents don their finest clothing,
usually suits for men and fancy dresses for the women, but some-
times ceremonial Indian costumes. At the meeting the members
pray, sing, and make ritual use of drum, fan, eagle bone, whistle,
rattle and prayer cigarette, the symbolic emblems of their faith.
The central event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quan-
tities sufficient to produce an hallucinatory state.
At an early but fixed stage in the ritual the members pass around
a ceremonial bag of peyote buttons. Each adult may take four, the
customary number, or take none. The participants chew the but-
tons, usually with some difficulty because of extreme bitterness;
later, at a set time in the ceremony any member may ask for more
peyote, occasionally a member may take as many as four more but-
tons. At sunrise on Sunday the ritual ends; after a brief outdoor
prayer, the host and his family serve breakfast. Then the members
118. Id.; see also W. D'AZEVEDO, STRAIGr wrrH THE MEDICINE 3 (1985).
119. See STEWART, supra note 2, at 45.
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depart. By morning the effects of the peyote disappear; the users
suffer no aftereffects.
Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread
and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament.
Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship; prayers are di-
rected to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the
other hand, to use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious.
Members of the church regard peyote also as a 'teacher' because it
induces a feeling of brotherhood with other members; indeed, it
enables the participant to experience the Deity. Finally, devotees
treat peyote as a 'protector.' Much as a Catholic carries his medal-
lion, an Indian G.I. often wears around his neck a beautifully
beaded pouch containing one large peyote button. 122
Had the Court balanced this deeply-religious interest against the
state's regulatory interest in controlling the use of peyote, the out-
come would clearly have been in favor of Smith and Black. This re-
sult is even more likely given that, prior to Smith II, in Oregon, only
one prosecution of a Native American for the sacramental use of pe-
yote had reached the appellate level courts.' 23 Moreover, while the
majority stresses the fact that peyote is included as a federal "Sched-
ule I" controlled substance, it is not considered a priority by those
who enforce federal drug laws. Only 19.4 pounds of peyote were
seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency between 1980 and 1987.
On the other hand, fifteen million pounds of marijuana were seized
during the same period.124 This data indicates that, while peyote
may pose a risk to the general welfare in theory, in practice, the low
quantity of its use does not warrant vigorous prosecution.125
Scant evidence of peyote's dangerousness exists.126 In fact, many
view the sacramental use of peyote as a positive aspect of Native
American culture, one which promotes unity and is often used to
combat alcoholism.127 The small percentage of Native Americans
who practice Peyotism generally live austere lifestyles and closely fol-
low the precepts of the Native American culture.128 The minor risk
122. Id. at 721-22, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 73-74 (footnote omitted).
123. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
124. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1620 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Moreover, as Justice Blackmun's dissent points out, peyote is extremely bit-
ter, making a user's experience with the drug often unpleasant and uncomfortable.
Accordingly, a recreational user might be discouraged from using the drug. Addi-
tionally, peyote does not pose the same risks as other more appetizing, more attrac-
tive drugs. The state's concern for its wide distribution and use, then, is unfounded.
Id. at 1619 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. See STEWART, supra note 2, at 3 and generally.
127. See supra note 4.
128. The Native American Church prohibits the use of alcohol. See generally Al-
baugh & Anderson, Peyote in the Treatment of Alcoholism Among American Indians, 131 AM.
J. PSYCHATRY 1247, 1249 (1974) ("[Tlhe philosophy, teachings, and format of the
[Native American Church] can be of great benefit to the Indian alcoholic."); Pas-
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posed by Peyotism coupled with its salutary influence on the Native
American culture requires an exemption from criminalization for Na-
tive American Church members' sacramental use of peyote.
2. Oregon Has No Regulatory Interest in Sacramental Use of Peyote
Regarding the other half of the balancing test-the state's "com-
pelling interest," the common thread running through all the cases
in which the state has prevailed is a protection of the state's interest
in orderliness. Early free exercise clause cases gave this interest
great latitude. 129 By avoiding the strict scrutiny standard of review,
the Court in Smith II did not need to find a "compelling governmen-
tal interest" in Oregon's proscription of peyote use. The Court did
need to find, however, that Oregon had an interest in regulating
drug use.
In lowering the standard of review for criminalized religious con-
duct, the Smith II Court stated that the criminalization of peyote was
not aimed at the plaintiffs' religious practice and that the state's in-
terest in controlling and criminalizing peyote use overrode any con-
siderations of the plaintiffs' religious freedoms.130 The Court
emphasized the fact that the denial of unemployment compensation
was aimed at the use of illegal drugs in general.ls'
carosa & Futterman, Ethnopsychodelic Therapy for Alcoholics: Observations in the Peyote Rit-
ual of the Native American Church, 8 J. PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS 215, 215 (1976) (Native
American peyote use aids in overcoming alcoholism.); STEWART, supra note 2, at 75,
109-10 (correlating Peyotism and abstinence from alcohol).
129. To illustrate, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Court up-
held a federal statute prohibiting polygamy despite the fact that polygamy was a cen-
tral tenet in the Mormon faith. Id at 161, 166-67. The Court reasoned that the
statute, although directly restricting the Mormons' practices, only incidentally-as
opposed to intentionally-affected the Mormons' beliefs. Thus, the Court found the
result was justified by the government's interest in regulating its citizens. Id. at 164-
67. Additionally, the Court found that the statute, although making the practice of
the Mormon faith more difficult, did not deny Reynolds the right to believe in his
religion. Id. at 166. This somewhat contrived distinction between practice and belief
was a basis for many of the Court's early decisions restricting religious freedoms. See
NowAK, supra note 27, § 17.7, at 1069.
130. Smith 11, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990). However, the Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder expressly rejected the interpretation the Court now adopts in Smith II:
[Ojur decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is
always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that
activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to
regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to pro-
mote the health, safety, and general welfare . . . . But to agree that relig-
iously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of
the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the
State to control.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1971) (citations omitted).
131. See Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-1606.
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Justice Scalia recognized that the state must have the power to reg-
ulate its illegal drug trade. This argument assumes the danger posed
by, and the need for the criminalization of, peyote and, specifically,
relies for support for these contentions on the inclusion of peyote on
Schedule I of federal controlled substances. But federal regulations
governing sacramental peyote use specifically state: "The listing of
peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the
non-drug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Na-
tive American Church, and members of the Native American Church
so using peyote are exempt from registration." 132 Furthermore, fed-
eral law also states that "it shall not be unlawful for any member of
the Native American Church to transport into Navajo country, buy,
sell, possess, or use peyote in any form in connection with the reli-
gious practices, sacraments or services of the Native American
Church."1ss This federal regulatory language, coupled with Ore-
gon's single appellate case involving criminal prosecution for posses-
sion of peyote for sacramental peyote use,' 3 4 seriously undermines
Justice Scalia's argument.
While Justice Scalia argues that the Court should allow states to
regulate themselves so long as they do so even-handedly, he fails to
recognize the special status given to Peyotism by the federal govern-
ment. Federal leniency toward peyote use at the very least indicates
a longstanding tolerance and acceptance by the federal government.
It may even indicate a constitutional floor, a minimum standard by
which all states must abide.i15
132. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1989).
133. 25 C.F.R. § 11.87H (1989). This title regulates the Department of the Inte-
rior in its dealings with Native Americans. The maximum sentence for a Native Amer-
ican transporting or selling peyote on Native American lands for nonreligious
purposes is nine months of labor or a fine not in excess of $100. See also American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) ("[I]t shall be the policy of
the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions ... including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom
to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites."); see generally Note, The First
Amendment and the American Indian Reliius Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting Native
American Religion, 71 IowA L. REV. 869 (1986).
134. The single appellate case involving criminal prosecution was State v. Soto, 21
Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975) (holding that the Oregon statutes under which
the defendant was arrested and convicted for peyote possession were constitutional).
135. As Justice Jackson stated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be ap-
plied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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By avoiding the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court also
did not address whether Oregon could carve out an exception to the
general proscription against peyote use without compromising its
regulatory interest.'3 6 In prior free exercise cases the state was re-
quired to bring forward evidentiary support to show the corrosive
effects a decision for the claimants would have on the state's inter-
ests.' 3 7 Had the Court adopted strict scrutiny, Oregon would have
had to show that the denial of an exemption to the Native American
Church was necessary to achieve its regulatory ends. Oregon, how-
ever, never argued a health and safety interest at the state court level
and, accordingly, did not argue the issue before the Supreme Court.
Further fortification for the Smith II claimants' contention that sac-
ramental peyote use does not pose a substantial threat to state inter-
ests is provided by the exemption of peyote use from the criminal
codes of twenty-three states.138 These statutory exemptions indicate
that other states have found sacramental use of peyote unique and
that the proscription of peyote is not a necessary condition to further-
ing state regulatory interests.
The harsh application of the free exercise doctrine to Smith II nec-
essarily raises questions about the Court's underlying purpose in
holding as it did. Was the Court using Smith II to send a signal to the
states that it would look kindly on their efforts to battle the drug
scourge facing the nation? Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Jus-
tice Blackmun's dissent seem to suggest this. As a rationale for her
decision, Justice O'Connor states that "drug abuse is 'one of the
greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population'
and thus 'one of the most serious problems confronting our society
today.' "139 Justice Blackmun, for the dissent, states: "One hopes
that the Court is aware of the consequences, and that its result is not
136. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that the state
could exclude, from those defined as terminated for cause, individuals who believed
their faith prohibited them from military-related employment); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1971) (holding that the in-home schooling of Amish children beyond
the eighth grade did not harm Wisconsin's interest in regulating the education of its
youth); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the state could, without
sacrificing regulatory interests, exempt Seventh Day Adventists who refused to work
on Saturdays from those individuals defined as terminated for cause).
137. This is the "no reasonable alternative/necessary" condition portion of the
analysis. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224-29 (1971) (The Court rejected as
"speculative" Wisconsin's arguments concerning the risks of allowing Amish chil-
dren to forego public education for an education based at home.); see also Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (The Court rejected as unsupported and insupporta-
ble the state's argument that granting unemployment compensation benefits to a per-
son who refused to work on Saturdays would unduly threaten its regulatory power.).
138. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
139. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1614 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)).
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a product of overreaction to the serious problems the country's drug
crisis has generated."140
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Smith and Black's
attorney, Craig Dorsay,141 raised a compelling argument in response
to the drug scare rationale. Dorsay's argument was based on the cul-
tural differences between whites and Native Americans. He said the
dangerousness of a drug is subjective; that is, a drug's dangerous-
ness depends on the susceptibility of those threatened by it. Along
these lines the rampant alcoholism among Native Americans, to-
gether with the lack of regulation over alcohol use, is testimony to
Native Americans' lack of political clout to quell the menace threat-
ening their culture. Were Native Americans the majority, he argued,
it might indeed be that alcohol, and not peyote, would be listed as a
Schedule I substance.142 It follows from this argument that as a re-
sult of culture-blind holdings like Smith H, the majority can success-
fully regulate drugs it believes pose a threat to it, while secularizing
minority religious practices. Requiring minority religious practices
to conform to those of majority religions threatens the health and
well-being of the minority religions' members.
3. Summary of the Smith II Religion-Neutrality Finding
To avoid strict scrutiny, the Smith II Court found Oregon's
criminalization of peyote to be religion-neutral.43 The Court's find-
ing raises the same issues discussed earlier by the Court in Braunfeld,
wherein Sunday-closing laws were found to be religion-neutral.t44
That Pennsylvania might as easily have chosen Tuesday or Thursday
as its day of rest rather than Sunday is absurd.
The religion-neutrality issue in Smith II is similar. Oregon clearly
has an interest in attempting to limit the trade in and consumption of
140. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Mr. Dorsay is the director of the Oregon Legal Services Native American
Program.
142. Dorsay argued:
[I]f Indian people were in charge of the United States right now, or in
charge of the government, and you look at the devastating impact that alco-
hol has had on Indian people and Indian tribes through the history of the
United States, you might find that alcohol was the Schedule One substance
and peyote was not listed at all. And we are getting here to the heart of an
ethnocentric view, I think, of what constitutes religion in the United States.
And I think that needs to be looked at very hard before determining what is
a dangerous substance and what is not.
Oral Argument, Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the
United States, at 27-28 (Nov. 6, 1989), Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-
1213), reprinted and analyzed in part in Drugs and Religious Freedom, AM. LAW. at 85 (Jan.
1990).
143. Smith 11, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
144. See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). For a discussion of
Braunfeld, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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peyote. Peyote use, for nonsacramental purposes, though, is mini-
mal.i45 As indicated above, federal seizures of the drug have been
minuscule; Oregon's prosecutions of peyote use have been spiritless.
Moreover, as noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, peyote use
may be self-limiting insofar as it makes its users physically ill.146
In any event, if very few nonsacramental users exist, a law prohibit-
ing its use is not religion-neutral. While it may not be aimed specifi-
cally at the Native American Church, its predominant restriction runs
against Church followers. If a law's primary consequence affects par-
ticular religious practices, it is not religion-neutral.
The Court initially used the religion-neutrality issue to discard the
strict scrutiny test. This test provided two safeguards for religious
practices-the state must first show a constitutionally legitimate,
compelling governmental interest and it must show that no reason-
able alternative for achieving its legitimate end exists. Had the
Court applied the old strict scrutiny test, it certainly would have re-
quired Oregon to exempt sacramental peyote use from its criminal
code. Including peyote possession in the criminal code as necessary
to achieve a legitimate and compelling governmental interest would
have been a difficult argument to make because twenty-three states
have already exempted sacramental peyote use from their criminal
codes, evidently without sacrificing their interest in drug control.14 7
Unless Oregon could show that its situation is somehow unique in
that the Oregon sacramental peyote users pose a risk to the state's
145. See supra text accompanying note 117.
146. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 n.7 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (Ingestion of peyote
is a difficult ordeal, regularly resulting in nausea and other unpleasant physical
manifestations.).
147. Eleven states expressly exempt sacramental peyote use from criminal codes.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3)
(1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.204.8 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8)
(1985); MINN. STAT. § 152.02, subd. 2(4) (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.541 (1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (1978); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-14(17)
(1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.11 (Vernon 1976); Wis. STAT.
§ 161.115 (1989); Wyo. STAT. 35-7-1044 (1988).
Moreover, twelve other states adopt the exemption that exists under federal law.
See ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.195 (1989); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-111(d) (1981);
Morr. CODE ANN. § 50-32-201 (1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-3(c) (West Supp.
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-88(d) (1990); N.D. CE.Nr. CODE § 19-03.1-02.4 (1989);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 21-28-2.01(c) (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-403(d) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-3(3) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3443(d) (1988); WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.50.201(d) (1985); W. VA. CODE § 60A-2-201(d) (1989).
The federal law exemption is found at 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990):
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply
to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using
peyote are exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures peyote
for or distributes peyote to the Native American Church is required to ob-
tain registration annually and to comply with all other requirements of law.
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general welfare, its denial of unemployment compensation claims
made by employees terminated for sacramental peyote use would
fail.
B. The Court Distinguishes Free Exercise Precedents as "Hybrids" Relying
on More than the Free Exercise Clause Alone
As further justification for its holding in Smith II, the Court distin-
guished other free exercise cases applying the strict scrutiny test as
not being "pure" free exercise cases. Rather, the Court character-
ized these other cases, including Cantwell v. Connecticut 148 and Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 149 as "hybrids"-those which involved issues such as
freedom of speech and parental rights.150 Having dispatched the
"compelling governmental interest" test as inapplicable to pure free
exercise cases, the Court then went on to balance the interests of the
claimants and the state. The Court accomplished this balancing by
following a rule that upholds any state law which has a secular pur-
pose and which only "incidentally" impinges on religious free-
doms.15, As previously discussed, however, the existence of a free
speech analysis in the previous cases was more of a historical acci-
dent; the analysis was a tool by which the Court carried strict scrutiny
into the free exercise area. The majority in Smith II speaks of these
cases as anomalies152 rather than recognizing them for what they
are-mechanisms by which the strict scrutiny standard was carried
into free exercise law.153
The Court in Smith II unartfully and ex post facto labels cases such as
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 154 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,155 Wisconsin v.
Yoder1 56 and Follet v. McCormick 157 as "hybrids." The category itself
is contrived:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-
ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-
148. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
149. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
150. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02 ("The present case does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activ-
ity or parental right.").
151. Id. at 1600, 1606.
152. Id. at 1601. The Court suggests that application of the standard in Cantwell
and Yoder to the present case would "produce a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws .... " Id. at 1604. This, in the Court's view, would be a "constitu-
tional anomaly." Id.
153. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 14-13, at 1256-60 (discussing the movement toward
formally adopting the least restrictive alternative-compelling state interest mode of
analysis in a free exercise context).
154. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
155. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
156. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
157. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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iously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other con-
stitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press,
• . . or the right of parents, ... to direct the education of their
children .... 158
Although elements of speech were involved in both Murdoch and
Cantwell, a look at the facts of these cases-state regulation of reli-
gious solicitation and literature distribution-also reveals that the
crux of these cases was the conduct of solicitation. The distinction
between speech and conduct in these cases is admittedly fine. How-
ever, given that the strict scrutiny standard first arose in free speech
cases and was gradually adopted in free exercise cases until its com-
plete adoption in Sherbert, it is clear that the element of free speech in
these cases was an instrument of change rather than a separate basis
for their holdings.
The Court's strongest argument for this hybrid stance comes from
Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the Court said:
the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of par-
ents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. And, when
the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of
the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is
required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the
First Amendment.' 59
The Yoder Court also stated that "[t]he impact of the compulsory-
attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not
only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively
compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts un-
deniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." 1 60
This language, omitted by the Smith II Court, emphasizes the impor-
tance of religion to the holding in Yoder, and arguably contradicts the
Smith II Court's proffered rationale.
A much weaker basis for the hybrid stance is provided by the
Court's quote from Cantwell: "The fundamental law declares the in-
terest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not
prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and opin-
ion be not abridged."16 The Court's argument that because the two
areas of first amendment law are at once articulated in the same sen-
tence hardly leads to the conclusion that the case could not be de-
cided one without the other.
158. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990) (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 1601 n.l (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added)).
160. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961))
(emphasis added).
161. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
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Furthermore, in speaking of the state's licensure requirements in
Cantwell, the Court said:
But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of reli-
gious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the
exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a reli-
gious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of lib-
erty protected by the Constitution.1 6 2
This clause, likewise omitted by the Court in Smith II, again reveals
the relative importance of religion in the Cantwell decision.
C. The Court's Fear of a Centrality Inquiry-The Fallacy
of the "Slippery Slope"
In Thomas v. Review Board,163 although it was unclear that assem-
bling tanks violated Thomas's religious beliefs, the Court nonethe-
less found a free exercise violation in the state's denial of
unemployment compensation benefits.164 While Thomas held for the
plaintiff, the Court in Smith H guilefully cited Thomas as standing for
the proposition that "courts must not presume to determine the
place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a reli-
gious claim"165 in order to hold for the state.
Justice Scalia's acknowledgment of the effect that the Smith II deci-
sion and, in particular, the avoidance of the centrality inquiry, may
have on minority religions is unsettling:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious prac-
tices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
164. See id. at 715-16. The difficulty with the Thomas decision is that it was argua-
bly not supported by the facts. At least one other Jehovah's Witness did work in the
tank manufacturing area and Thomas himself had worked previously in the metal
foundry which provided the metal for the tanks. The existence of these facts elicited
the following reasoning from the Court: "Courts should not undertake to dissect
religious beliefs because the believer admits he is 'struggling' with his position or
because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more so-
phisticated person might employ." Id. at 715.
The Thomas holding gives credence to the majority's fears in Smith II, that "[t]o
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto him-
self." Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990).
165. Smith 1I, 110 S. Ct. at 1604. In Thomas v. Review Bd., the claimant's religious
claims were at least arguably weak since another person of the same faith was per-
forming the job. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 711. The Court nevertheless held for
Thomas and rejected the idea of looking into the legitimacy of his beliefs. See id at
715. But in Smith II, the Thomas rationale was used as a sword against individuals who
had legitimate and verifiable religious beliefs. Thomas thus was used to foreclose the
Court's option of looking into the sincerity of Smith and Black's Peyotism. See supra
notes 76-77, 111 and 164.
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quence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all reli-
gious beliefs.' 66
By this language, the Court indicates that it will not overrule a state
criminal proscription, no matter what the consequences to those not
in the rule-making majority.
The Court, in this part of its decision, commits the fallacy of the
"slippery slope" by predicting that an endless stream of religious ad-
herents would seek to avoid state criminal codes if the Court had
found for Smith and Black.167 Courts frequently employ a parade of
horriblesl6s to show where a rule advocated by the concurrence or
dissent will eventually lead if followed to its extreme. 169 Two simple
methods exist by which to attack this type of argument. First, one
can challenge the truth and causal connection contained in the prem-
ise that if we allow Native Americans a constitutional right to use
peyote, then many others will come forward seeking to exempt them-
selves from criminal laws on religious grounds. Second, one can re-
fute the argument by showing there exists a principled rule which
would effectively draw the proper line and thus stop the potential
slide down the slippery slope.
The Court's slippery slope rationale for avoiding the centrality in-
quiry is this-if the Court does not draw the line at criminalized con-
duct, then federal judges will be forced to judge the importance of
166. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
Further exemplifying his callousness toward the case, Justice Scalia wondered
aloud during oral argument about a constitutional exemption for human sacrifice,
accommodating "only the Aztecs." Oral Argument, Official Transcript Proceedings
Before the Supreme Court of the United States, at 45 (Nov. 6, 1989), Smith II, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213), reprinted and analyzed in part in Drugs and Religious Free-
dom, AM. LAw. 85 (Jan. 1990).
167. Cf. P. HURLEY, LOGIC 134-36 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter LoGIc] (The slippery
slope conclusion occurs when "an argument rests upon an alleged chain reaction and
there is not sufficient reason to think that the chain reaction will actually take
place."). Id. at 134; see also infra note 169.
168. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
suggests that the "parade of horribles" listed by the majority "not only fails as a
reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead demonstrates just the
opposite-that courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurispru-
dence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state inter-
ests." Id.
169. See LOGIC, supra note 167, at 134-36.
[M]any slippery slopes rest on a mere emotional conviction on the part of
the arguer that a certain action or policy is bad, and the arguer attempts to
trump up support for his or her position by citing all sorts of dire conse-
quences that will result if the action is taken or the policy followed. In such





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/16
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
religious practices under the strict scrutiny standard of review. Re-
quiring judges to make this difficult inquiry will ultimately burden
the judicial system, and lead to unfair and inconsistent results for
both the states and religious adherents.
As for the first premise, it is indeed likely that allowing a constitu-
tional exemption to the Native American Church would burden the
courts with a stream of insincere free exercise claimants. Certainly
"line-drawing" will take several years and consume judicial re-
sources. However, courts exist to purvey justice, not to make deci-
sions in the most efficient, mechanical way.
An alternative attack against the Court's floodgate argument is
that several courts have considered the centrality of a claimant's reli-
gious practice relative to a state's interest and have reached reason-
able results.170 All courts reviewing the issue of marijuana use for
ostensibly religious reasons have denied it based on the state's inter-
est in controlling drug use.' 7 ' In none of these cases was the claim-
ant able to show a historically consistent use of the drug as is
evidenced by Peyotism.t 72 The Court's contention, therefore, that
170. See, e.g., United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1004 (1985) (First amendment free exercise of religion clause does not protect
marijuana use by Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church.); United States v. Hudson, 431 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1970) (First amendment not violated by disallowing marijuana and her-
oin use by Moslems.); Whyte v. United States, 471 A.2d 1018 (D.C. App. 1984)
(State's interest in curtailing accessibility and use of marijuana is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest outweighing Rastafarian's religious interest in marijuana use.);
State v. Randall, 540 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (Marijuana, LSD and hashish
use by Aquarian Brotherhood Church to promote meditation and self-understanding
found to be inconsistent with religious practices.); see also People v. Werber, 19 Cal.
App. 3d 598, 97 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1971) (discussed infra at note 172).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Werber, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 598, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 150. In Werber, the
California court denied a religious exemption because it found, unlike Woody, mari-
juana was not the recipient of defendant's prayer and was not used exclusively in a
religious ritual. Werber, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 609-10, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
An additional argument against the centrality inquiry, one not offered by the
Court but advocated by others, states that religious practices are transitory in nature
so that a finding of centrality is never warranted. Fein & Reynolds, On Faith and Law:
Secular Encyclical, Legal Times, June 18, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
Freedom-of-religion absolutists frequently overlook the fact that religious
tenets are not fixed like the North Star. Over time, the Roman Catholic
Church has altered fundamental precepts on such matters as papal infallibil-
ity, celibacy of the clergy, and the centrality of the earth in the universe. In
the future, women may even be admitted into the Roman Catholic priest-
hood. The changeability of religious practice and dogma discredits the ar-
gument that adaptation to secular law is at war with the idea of religion
itself.
Id. at 20. The concern is whether granting wholesale exemption for religious drug
use will allow future drug users to use religion as a guise for drug use, while those to
whom the exemption was granted have abandoned the practice. See Smith H, 110 S.
Ct. at 1618 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The history and consistency of peyote use
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finding in favor of Smith and Black would result in a "flood" of
claimants seeking free exercise relief from criminal laws that require
difficult inquiries, is unfounded.
The Court ultimately held that since other states' exemptions of
peyote were constitutional, Oregon could likewise constitutionally
exempt peyote from its criminal code.' 7T The "principle of federal-
ism" here is taken to the extreme. Before Smith II, states were forced
to conform to a "higher law." Today, after Smith II, no limits exist to
restrain a state from criminalizing religious conduct. A state may run
roughshod over minority religion practices so long as the proscrip-
tion also restricts at least one person outside the religious group.'74
V. PROPOSED RULE
A workable rule exists that would allow the Court to constitution-
ally exempt sacramental peyote use while at the same time not allow
an exemption for recreational drug users. The proposed rule would
first consider the history and tradition of the religious practice, and,
secondly, consider the purpose and role of the religious practice.
These considerations would then be weighed against the modern
concept of a "compelling governmental interest."175 As a result,
only those religious practices with a strong historical base and which
are not ends in themselves, but means to religious ends, would sur-
vive. This rule would immediately exclude all recently-adopted crim-
inally-proscribed religious practices and those whose sole purpose is
not a means to an authentic religious end.
Under this rule, were Reynolds decided today, the Mormons would
arguably be allowed to practice polygamy. The Mormons had a tra-
dition of polygamy for over three-hundred years, thus meeting the
first element. Also, polygamy was not an end in itself because it fos-
tered a community lifestyle essential to the Church.176 Moreover,
under this rule, the Court would have decided Braunfeld differently.
Hebrews who observe the Sabbath have done so for thousands of
years, thus meeting the requirements of the first element of the pro-
among Native Americans refutes this concern. See supra notes 19, 116 and accompa-
nying text. While Native Americans may abandon peyote use someday, this is not a
forceful reason for denying the practice today.
173. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1606; cf. Pound, A Survey of Social Interest, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1943) ("When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with
respect to other claims or demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same
plane . . . [lest] we decide the question in advance in our very way of putting it.").
174. University of Chicago Law Professor Michael McConnell strongly urges crim-
inal-justice exemptions to accommodate religious practices unless the religious prac-
tice would endanger the community's "peace or safety." Fein & Reynolds, On Faith
and Law: Secular Encyclical, Legal Times, June 18, 1990, at 18, col. 1.
175. See supra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
176. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1879).
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posed rule. Likewise, the second element is met because the intent
of the practice serves the same practical purposes served by Penn-
sylvania's statute-as a day of rest and not an end in itself. Certainly,
cases would arise making the decision more difficult under this rule,
especially in the context of criminalized activity. But the state has a
protectable regulatory interest in criminalized activity, and so, where
proper, the Court could shield states from particularly threatening
practices.
The offered rule is not a per se rule. A per se rule would constitu-
tionalize all religious practices, regardless of how divisive they are to
state interests. The offered rule recognizes that states have an inter-
est in regulating and protecting their citizenry.
In sum, the difficulty of drawing a line is never a good reason for
refusing to draw it. While the Court fears the specter of endless
claimants seeking to avoid criminal prosecution or other unfavorable
treatment on the basis of religious freedom,177 many courts have ad-
dressed the issue and have had little difficulty distinguishing merito-
rious from meritless claims.17 8 In interpreting the open-ended
clauses of the Constitution, the Court should not allow rigidity and
predictability to hold sway when the legitimately-held, nondestruc-
tive beliefs or practices of a minority group are at stake.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO SMITH II
Like several of the recent Supreme Court decisions, Smith II has
provoked Congressional response. Representative Solarz of New
York has introduced a bill requiring the strict scrutiny standard for
cases involving all religious practices, but without specifically ad-
dressing the specific concerns raised by Smith J. 179 A bill introduced
by Senator Inouye of Hawaii, on the other hand, apparently specifi-
cally exempts peyote use as it seeks to "remove[] certain barriers to
the free exercise of, and to ensure equal respect for, and treatment
of, traditional religious practice by Indians, Alaska Natives and native
Hawaiians." 180
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Smith II is a return to the earlier, more
177. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) ("Behind every free exercise claim is a spec-
tral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted
with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every
stripe.").
178. See supra note 170.
179. H.R. 5377, 101st Congress, 2d Sess. (1990) (requiring a state to show a
"compelling state interest" in banning or restricting a religious practice).
180. S. 1979, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. (1989).
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restrictive days of free exercise clause interpretation. Whether or
not one takes issue with Justice Scalia's penchant for absolute
majoritarian rule, one must fear the adoption of such a rule for reli-
gious practices in a predominantly Christian society. Smith II poses a
serious risk to minority religions; it secularizes and forces minority
religions into the fold. Even given the scope of the national drug
problem, the innocuous use of peyote does not justify the Smith H
outcome. Sacramental peyote use has not been shown to lead to ad-
diction and is used in the Indian community to reinforce cultural
bonds and to overcome alcohol and chemical abuse. The decision
significantly restricts the rights of Native Americans and others to
engage in practices central to their respective religions. Justice
Scalia's heavy-handed opinion looms menacingly over minority reli-
gious practices.a18 A government founded upon principles of sepa-
ration of church and state should not turn a blind eye on states which
effectively outlaw minority religions by outlawing their central ten-
ets.
William B. Butler
181. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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